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BOOK REVIEWS

A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good, by Robert Adams. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006. 256 pages. $35 (paperback).
THOMAS L. CARSON, Loyola University Chicago
Adams proposes a theory of virtue, or a theory about what it is to be a
morally good person—he uses the term “virtue” to refer to good moral
character and good traits of character. He contrasts his theory with what he
calls “virtue ethics.” Virtue ethics holds that “a theory of virtue provides
the right foundation for all of ethics, and that the ethics of duty should
be reduced to, or replaced by, the ethics of virtue” (6). Adams offers brief
but forceful arguments against defining right and wrong actions in terms
of what a virtuous person would do. The book consists of three parts. In
part I, Adams states his theory of virtue. Part II discusses the relationship
between self and others. Part III addresses recent findings in social psychology, which according to some, show “that there really are no virtues
and vices, and indeed no traits of character” (12).
Adams defines moral virtue as “persisting excellence in being for the
good” (14). Being virtuous involves being for the good and against the
bad. According to Adams,
There are many ways of being for something. They include: loving it, liking
it, respecting it, wanting it, wishing for it, appreciating it, thinking highly of
it, speaking in favor of it, and otherwise intentionally standing for it symbolically, acting to promote or protect it, and being disposed to do such things.
(15–16)

Adams holds that there are a wide variety of goods that virtue can be for.
Virtue can be for the good/welfare of others and oneself; it can also be for
intellectual and aesthetic values.
Virtue involves being for the good, but:
Not every way of being for something good is virtuous or a virtue. One
can seek goods selfishly, only for oneself; or unjustly, only for one’s friends,
without regard for the rights of strangers. . . . What distinguishes virtuous
ways of being for something from other ways? The criterion I propose is that
virtuous ways of being for the good must be excellent. (23–24)
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Adams does not provide criteria for determining presence or absence of
the kind of excellence in question. “The grounds for judgments of excellence of ways of being for the good are too varied, and often too subtle,
I believe, for any algorithmic treatment” (26). Nonetheless, Adams has a
theory about the nature of excellence—things are excellent to the extent
that they resemble God. He defends this view in Finite and Infinite Goods
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and reaffirms it in the present
book. Some readers of this journal will be disappointed that he says very
little about his divine resemblance theory of excellence and good and bad
and his divine command theory of right and wrong in the present book.1
As Adams notes, his theory about the nature of virtue is very similar
to the theory Thomas Hurka defends in his book Virtue, Vice, and Value
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Very roughly, Hurka holds that
virtue consists in loving goods and hating evils. Unlike Adams, Hurka
proposes a formula for determining whether or not a person’s attitude
about something is virtuous. According to Hurka, love/hate for something
is virtuous to the extent that it is proportional to the goodness/badness of
the thing in question. This view seems to imply that having special concern for one’s own friends and family and for one’s own projects and endeavors is contrary to virtue, since it is false that our own personal friends
and family have much greater intrinsic value than other people (and it
is false that our own endeavors have greater value than other people’s).
Hurka attempts to answer this objection by claiming that there are “agentrelative values, ones that are good or evil only or to a greater degree from
some people’s points of view than from others” (Hurka, 199; quoted by
Adams on 27). But Adams argues that Hurka’s theory commits him to an
indefensible view about what things are intrinsically valuable.
Hurka makes clear that the values he is talking about in this context are
. . . “intrinsic” values. By one thing’s being better than another from some
person’s point of view he does not mean just that the person subjectively
values the former more than the latter. But while it is quite appropriate, and
normally virtuous, to care more intensely about a life partner’s health than
about most other people’s, it would be repulsively self-centered to think that
one’s partner’s health is intrinsically more important than other people’s. (27)

Another attempt to formulate a standard for ascriptions of virtue is Julia
Driver’s “trait consequentialism” which holds roughly that virtues are
1
There are serious problems involved in basing a theory of human virtue on resemblance
to God. Many of the moral virtues, such as courage and self-control, essentially involve human limitations. It seems untenable to hold that excellence in these matters ultimately consists in resembling a perfect God who is not subject to human fears, and vulnerabilities, and
appetites. The Christian doctrine of the incarnation may afford Adams an answer to these
problems. Adams could say that we are virtuous to the extent that our relevant attitudes,
emotions, actions, and dispositions resemble those of God in the human person of Christ.
For a very detailed development of this view, see Linda Zagzebski’s Divine Motivation Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Adams doesn’t talk about the idea of the
imitation of Christ in the present book, but see his review of Zagzebski in Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 73 (2006): 493–497.
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traits of character that produce good effects. Adams offers several criticisms of her view. Imagine people who are such that beating one’s child
when s/he is exactly 5.57 years old greatly increases the life expectancy
of the child. Some of these people have an intense desire to beat children
when they are exactly 5.57 years old and take intense pleasure in doing
so. Driver regards this special trait as a virtue. Adams finds this extremely
counterintuitive. He also thinks it very counterintuitive that Driver would
have to count competitiveness as a virtue if it is generally a beneficial trait,
as defenders of capitalism have sometimes claimed. Adams argues:
Competitiveness, as normally understood, involves hostility to the interests
of other people (a hostility limited to certain contexts, to be sure). That can
hardly be a virtue, even if it has good consequences. (56)

Adams categorizes different kinds of virtues:
Some virtues are defined by motives which in turn are defined by goods
that one is for in having them, as benevolence, for example, is defined by the
motive of desiring or willing the good of others. We may call these motivational virtues. . . . Other virtues—courage, for example, and also self-control
and patience—are not defined in that way, by particular motives or by one’s
aims, but are rather structural features of the way one organizes and manages whatever motives one has. (33)

Some virtues such as practical wisdom do not fit neatly into either category and certain kinds of physical and psychological strengths, e.g., good
memory and physical vigor, can enhance one’s virtues, although they are
not virtues themselves.
Adams defines a vice as “a trait of character that is bad in such a way
that if you have it, that counts (not necessarily decisively) against your
having a good moral character” (36). His classification of vices is most
illuminating. Vices of weakness, such as cowardice and incontinence, are
structural vices and are not defined by goods and bads that they are for
or against. Vices of excess, for example, avarice, sensuality, workaholism,
and chauvinism, involve being too much for certain goods. The vices of
self preference consist in excessive concern for one’s own good. The vice
of ruthlessness consists in excessive willingness to sacrifice the good of
others. Motivational vices corresponding to motivational virtues are vices
of opposition or indifference to the good. Chief among these vices are malice, cruelty, envy, vindictiveness, and Schadenfreude. “No vice seems more
appalling to me than cruelty. It attacks great goods of personal life—its enjoyment and sometimes its persistence and even its meaning—and takes
satisfaction in doing so” (41). Adams qualifies this statement; he thinks
that desiring that others be punished because one thinks that they deserve
to be punished is compatible with being virtuous. Desiring retributive
punishment can be construed as a case of being for the good—one might
desire that someone be punished to remove the evil of his “having gotten
away with” an unjust act.
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The second part of the book asks whether moral goodness is good for
those who are morally good. Does moral goodness enhance the welfare
of those who are morally good? Adams has much to say about this question. Plato and the Stoics contend that being morally virtuous is both necessary and sufficient for flourishing. Aristotle holds that moral excellence
is an important and necessary constituent of human welfare but rejects the
view that it is sufficient for personal welfare. Many modern philosophers
think that it is possible for morally bad people to flourish, and Nietzsche
holds that some of the virtues lauded by Christian morality are harmful
to their possessors. Adams holds that moral virtues are intrinsically good
and at least partly constitutive our well being. He says that “virtue is not a
sufficient condition of well-being for its possessors, but . . . it is a necessary
condition of the best sort of happiness or well-being” (61).
Adams defines altruism as other-regarding benevolence: “It signifies
any motive that takes as its end or goal the good or well-being of one
or more persons other than oneself” (65). Altruism has enormous instrumental value. According to Adams, altruism is also intrinsically valuable.
It is reasonable for me, not only to desire the good of other people, but to
desire that I help promote their good. Loving parents can desire that their
children be altruistic and want them to be prepared to act altruistically,
even when doing so is contrary to the children’s self-interest.
[A] person’s good or well-being is not the only thing one can want or favor
or support for that person’s sake. In many cases, if you have asked me to do
something, I can do it for you even if I don’t think it will be good for you. That
can be an expression of my respect or friendship for you. . . . Another thing
you can want for people you love is that they should be worthy of love and
esteem. (69)

Adams offers a very illuminating discussion of friendship and the virtue
of caring for common projects, e.g., being a good teammate or good colleague. He stresses that friendship involves more than an altruistic desire
for the good of the other person. It also requires that one desire and prize
the relationship with the other person.
The third part of the book addresses recent work in psychology that, according to many people, shows that the kinds of strong, causally-efficacious,
enduring traits of character that constitute virtues and vices don’t exist.
One well-known study of helping behavior is often cited in support of this
view. The study observed subjects who emerged from a phone booth to
witness someone (who was part of the research team) drop and scatter her
papers on the floor in front of them. The study sought to determine which
people would attempt to help the person who dropped her papers. A dime
was planted in the phone booth before some of the subjects entered. Fourteen of the sixteen people who found a dime stopped to help the stranger.
Only one of twenty-five who didn’t find a dime in the phone booth stopped
to help. This is a very striking result and shows that seemingly trivial differences in situations can make a huge difference in people’s behavior.
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“Situationist” psychology holds that situational factors are generally
a much more important factor in determining people’s behavior than
their imputed fixed traits of character. In a famous study from the 1920s,
Hartshorne and May sought to test honesty in school children. They measured the frequency of lying, cheating, and stealing and correlated them
with other variables.
The experimenters found that individual children were fairly consistent, or
stable, over time in repeated tests of their honesty or dishonesty, in the same
type of situation. But they also found, to their surprise, that individual results in different types of situations showed low correlations, and thus little
cross-situational consistency. (116)

Assuming that the social science in question is sound, what are the implications of these results for theories of virtue? Hurka concludes that virtues construed as traits of character that involve deep-seated behavioral
dispositions don’t exist and that we should alter our concepts of virtues
and vices and apply them primarily to actions, occurrent attitudes, and
mental states in particular situations. A very different response (made by
Rachana Kamtekar in “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of
Our Character,” Ethics 114 [2004], 458–491) is to say that the classical conception of virtue is untouched by research work in psychology—virtue is
quite rare but still an ideal we should aspire to. Adams rejects both of these
responses and argues that the evidence does not require that we abandon
the idea that there are enduring traits of character that are central objects
of our moral evaluation. However, he thinks that we need to acknowledge
that virtues are frail and “modular.” With respect to the virtue of honesty,
Adams notes that the English word “honesty” has a very broad meaning.
Being honest involves possessing: 1) the disposition not to lie or deceive
others, 2) the disposition not to cheat in rule-governed activities, and 3)
the disposition not to steal from others. These are very disparate dispositions and there is no reason to think that they are strongly correlated. The
Hartshorne-May study would seem to show that it is very rare for people
to be consistently honest in all these respects in a wide range of different circumstances. But it also supports the view that narrower modules of
these virtues (e.g., not cheating in sports, not cheating in one’s academic
work, not lying to one’s spouse, not lying to one’s clients, and not stealing
from one’s employer) are common and reasonably robust in determining
our behavior. Adams thinks that this empirical evidence weighs strongly
against Plato’s view about the unity of virtues according to which, in order
to have any of the virtues, one must have all of them.
Adams does other things to try to defuse situationist psychology’s challenge to traditional views of the virtues. He stresses that virtues are not
simply dispositions to act in certain ways. In the case of experiments that
test helping behavior, he argues that the duties to help others are imperfect duties which allow people wide latitude in acting to fulfill them. Each
of us has an obligation to help others, but no one has an obligation to help
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on every occasion, so not every case of failing to help observed in these
experiments is contrary to virtue.
Adams claims that there is a great deal of moral luck in the development of any person’s character so that virtue is to a very large measure a
gift, rather than an individual achievement; nonetheless, virtue is excellent and admirable.
This is an outstanding book, one of the very best books ever written on
this most important topic. It is required reading for anyone interested in the
virtues or ethical theory. Adams’s many examples are very apt and helpful; some of his observations about them are gems—marvels of insight and
good sense. Adams’s book is also very clear and lucid, unusually clear and
accessible for such an important contribution to philosophy. This makes it
very suitable for use in upper division undergraduate courses. This book
deserves a wide readership by philosophers and students of philosophy.

The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Sceptical Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg.
Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2009.
AKU VISALA, Oxford University
The Will to Imagine (henceforth Will) is the latest installment in J. L.
Schellenberg’s trilogy on philosophy of religion. In the two previous
books, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (2005) and The Wisdom to
Doubt: A Justification of Religious Scepticism (2007), Schellenberg strongly
criticised most classical and contemporary arguments for belief in God. In
philosophy of religion circles, Schellenberg is probably best known for his
earlier work Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993), in which he presents his famous argument against theism from the hiddenness of God.
The argument from hiddenness has since created a great deal of debate
and Schellenberg himself has defended it in several different forums. The
reader of these books and his other works might easily get the impression
that Schellenberg seeks to abandon all possible forms of religion and advocate some form of naturalism. But this, as Will shows, is far from being
the case.
The book is basically what the title says it is: an attempt to defend a certain kind of religious attitude—an attitude that is neither belief in some
sort of God nor belief in the non-existence of God or gods. Schellenberg
has set out to formulate a third position between these two alternatives.
This middle position, however, is not strictly speaking an agnostic one as
one might first think but a religious one—a sceptical religious attitude.
Instead of religious or non-religious belief, Schellenberg suggests that faith
would be a more proper attitude. The proper object of faith is what he
calls ultimism. Ultimism is what

